Engaging in Twitter thematic content analysis to understand the political messages of the Jokowi-Amin and Prabowo-Sandi success teams in the 2019 Indonesian presidential election

Febriansyah Kulau [a,1,*], Benni Setiawan [b,2] Chatia Hastasari[C,3]

[a,b] Communication Department, Universitas Negeri Yogyakarta, Colomboo street, Sleman Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta, 55281, Indonesia

[c] International Doctoral Program for Asia-Pacific Studies, Social Science Faculty, National Chengchi University, Wenshan District, Taipei City, Taiwan

[1] febriansyahkulau@student.uny.ac.idr *; [2] bennisetiawawan@uny.ac.id; [3] 109265507@nccu.edu.tw

* corresponding author

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ABSTRACT

This article discusses religious and religious symbols narrated as political commodities in the 2019 presidential election on the twitter platform. The battle for narratives in the 2019 Indonesian presidential election was colored by the use of these issues on social media, this has led to increased sensitivity between religions and increasing issues of intolerance. For this reason this research has been conducted to investigate the categories of political messages narrated in tweets during the seven months of the 2019 presidential election campaign. Twitter, which was published on 23 September 2018 to 13 April 2019. based on the findings of this study, it shows that the success team of the two candidate pairs in narrating religious symbols and religious symbols is divided into 6 message categories. The message categories are Commodification of Religious Greetings, Clothing as a Religious Symbol, Title as a Religious Symbol, *Salat* and *Nyekar* as Political Commodities, An Expression of Gratitude as Political Commodities, House of Worship as a Place for Political Campaign.

1. Introduction

Religion is an important reference or guideline for Indonesian society in determining attitudes and behavior. A survey released by the Pew Research Center on June 13 2018 revealed that 83% of respondents in Indonesia consider religion to be important. This figure, when compared with a number of countries researched, is the third highest after Ethiopia 98% and Pakistan 94%. This number is also far above the percentage of the importance of religion in US society which is only around 53% [1].

Another survey released by the Pew Research Center on April 22, 2019 revealed that as many as 93% thought that religion was important in state life. This figure places Indonesia as a country whose people consider religion to be the most important thing in state life. Indonesia is far above developed countries such as the United States, where only 19% of the people hold this view. Then there is France at 39% followed by Germany 28%, South Korea 25%, Netherlands 22%, England 21%, Australia 15%, and Japan 8% [2].

The two surveys illustrate that religion is not an important issue for many countries, both in the private life of these people and in political life and state power. Meanwhile, the Indonesian people

surveyed saw religion as something important and main in their daily lives. For the Indonesian people, the PRC survey strengthens evidence of the strong ties between society and religion. For this nation, religion is the main source of the search for the meaning of life, a fundamental factor for all life activities, and a crucial pole in the state.

Seeing the fact that Indonesian society cannot be separated from religion, it is often used by politicians in political contestation. Religion and religious symbols are used as commodities to attract as much support as possible. Research conducted by Ramadlan & Masykuri (2018) revealed that the implementation of the Religional Head Election (HRE) in 2015 to 2017 was colored by religion and religious symbols. The research also reveals that religion is used as a political commodity in two ways, namely: first, invitations to vote for candidates who are of the same religion, or not to elect candidates who are not of the same religion; second, is the black campaign [3].

Religion and religious symbols carried over to the contestation of the Presidential Election as identity politics [4]. This was clearly seen in the 2019 Presidential Election. Both pairs of candidates both used religion and religious symbols as commodities. Candidate Pair Joko Widodo-Maaruf Amin used religion and religious symbols during the election of the vice presidential candidate Maaruf Amin. Amin is the General Chairperson of the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI) for the period 2015 to 2020. Amin is also a respected scholar among the Nahdlatul Ulama. As is well known Nahdlatul Ulama or NU is the largest Islamic organization in Indonesia. The election of Amin as vice president is considered as a counter to religion that are always aimed at Jokowi and against people who are against Jokowi's leadership [5].

In the candidate pair Prabowo Subianto-Sandiaga Salahudin Uno, narrating himself as a candidate pair supported by the ulama. This is because Prabowo is a presidential candidate who is supported through the ijtima 'ulama process. Meanwhile, the ulama who initiated this were conservative Muslims who succeeded in overthrowing Basuki Tjahaja Purnama in the 2017 DKI Jakarta Regional Head Election [6]. Prabowo's narrative as a presidential candidate supported by ulama is a way to attract support from Muslim circles. This proves that the two candidate pairs both use religion and religious symbols as their commodities in order to gain support from the Indonesian people.

Indonesia faces the problem of tolerance [7], because of the use of religion and religious symbols as political commodities, but in the vision and mission of the two pairs of candidates, none of them mentioned the handling of intolerance. The potential for intolerance to become a serious problem in the 2019 presidential election [8], [9]. Meanwhile, a candidate pair seems to ignore the issue of intolerance, but instead uses identity politics that can sharpen intolerance [10]–[12].

One of the problems that arise as a result of this is hate speech. This hate speech filled the public space in the 2019 presidential election which could take the form of a negative campaign [13]–[15]. This can also change the behavior of the community [15], which if allowed to disrupt national stability. Therefore it can be said that intolerance can disrupt national stability [16]. In this regard, pairs of candidates should pay attention to this, but if you look at the vision and mission of the existing candidate pairs, none of the presidential candidate pairs have focused on this. The focus of Jokowi-Amin's vision and mission is human resource development, economy, law, governance and security, while Prabowo-Sandi focuses on economy, law, welfare, security and national personality [17].

This indicates that the issue of intolerance in the 2019 presidential election is considered not yet a concern of the two candidates. The two candidate pairs, namely, Jokowi-Amin and Prabowo-Sandi, even though the Presidential Election is an agenda to elect a national leader for the next five years. Meanwhile, instead of promoting solutions due to the use of religious and religious symbols as political commodities, they continue to use them.

One of the important processes in the presidential election is the campaign process (political marketing) [18]. The campaign is an opportunity for political communicators to be able to persuade and encourage the public to be able to choose a candidate pair. The campaign process used, of course, uses communication as its main tool. Therefore in politics, communication plays an important role, because communication is not only a means of conveying messages but more than

that. Communication has a role in politics in order to change the mindset of society in order to act in accordance with the wishes of the message giver [19], [20].

In the 2019 Presidential Election campaign series, politicians, supporters or pairs of candidates communicate to gain support. Communication in this political process is known as political communication. Political communication can be defined as the process of spreading meaning or messages related to the function of a political system [21]. If likened to a political contestation is a war, then political communication is the most important part of the contestation. Or it can be said that political communication is the main weapon in winning the contest. Therefore, whoever masters the "weapon" can come out victorious. The purpose of political communication is to make other people behave that may not be done by other people, meaning that the political communicator can provide messages in the campaign to voters with objectives that are for certain interests [22].

The uniqueness of the 2019 Presidential Election compared to the previous Regional Head Election (HRE) was that the conventional campaign media used by the presidential election participants shifted to new media, namely social media. This is not without reason, social media is currently a media commodity that is often used by people, especially millennials [23], [24]. A campaign process that focuses on social media as a medium of communication.

These issues are often used as commodities in political campaigns carried out by candidate pairs, especially through their campaign teams. Research conducted by Valentina & Rahardjo (2019) which examines the campaign process in the 2018 North Sumatra Regional Head Election (HRE), which shows that the campaign team deliberately uses religious narratives such as calls for candidates who share the same faith. Another finding is that these narratives are not only narrated in mass media but also online media, especially Instagram and Whatsapp [25].

Another study was conducted by Mahadika & Sardini (2019) who examined religious sentiment during the 2017 DKI Jakarta Governor Election. The research reveals that religious sentiment in the 2017 DKI Regional Head Election can be spread massively because of the existence of social media, where social media can spread information massively and cannot be controlled [26].

One of the social media that is often used as a place for political discourse and narrative battles is Twitter. Twitter as a virtual public space has become a separate trend in presenting a political atmosphere and an arena for political contestation ahead of the election to replace the President [27]. So it can be concluded that Twitter as a means of virtual public space can be a place for political discourse and narrative battles, especially issues of political religion.

As explained above, Twitter as a virtual public space and text-based social media will support the discourse and narrative battle. This is because discourses and narratives conveyed through writing will be easier to persuade someone than just pictures, in other words when compared to Instagram, Facebook and Youtube, Twitter is better in terms of a place for discourse or narrative and propaganda battles [28].

The religion and religious symbols that are played out in the discourse and narrative battles on Twitter can be said to be a commodity. Because politicians, campaign teams or winners and even candidate pairs are willing to use the issue to attract the maximum support possible from voters. Even though the use of religious and religious symbols as political commodities is very dangerous because of their explosive nature and destructive impact between individuals [26] they still do it.

2. Theorical Framework

2.1. Political Campaign

A campaign is an action to influence the cognitive and affection of others, with communication skills [29]. Meanwhile, another definition is expressed by Rogers and Storey (1987), which defines a campaign as a planned communication action with the aim of creating a certain effect or effect on a number of audiences in a certain period of time [30]. Based on the two definitions above, it can be concluded that a campaign is an act of communication designed in such a way as to influence a person or group of people within a certain period of time.

In the context of this article, the campaign definition used also adheres to the General Election Commission Regulations. Campaign according to General Election Commission (PKPU) Regulation

No. 23 of 2018 concerning the General Election Campaign (Pemilu) is the activity of Election Contestants or other parties appointed by Election Contestants to convince voters by offering the vision, mission, programs, and / or self-image of the Election Contestants. The regulation also explains that campaign materials or commodities are all objects or other forms containing the vision, mission, programs, and / or other information of Election Contestants, symbols or pictures that are distributed for campaign purposes aimed at inviting people to vote for Election Contestants [31]. This definition becomes a guideline for the data collection process in selecting tweets during the seven months of the campaign period.

2.2. Religion and Religious Symbol

Symbol according to Berlo (1977) is a symbol that has an object [32]. Another definition of symbols put forward by Cobuild (1987) explains if a symbol is a form or design used to represent an idea; or a symbol is something that represents society or other aspects of life [33]. The meaning of symbols is also expressed by Jery (1991), who states that symbols are indirect representations of basic meanings such as religious symbols [34]. Based on the explanation above, it can be concluded that symbols are the result of representation of ideas, society or other aspects of life that have fundamental meanings such as religious symbols.

Religious symbols themselves are all symbols, signals, and / or other markers used by community members to refer to the existence and identity of a particular religion [35]. Symbols which include religious symbols have two types, namely verbal symbols and non-verbal symbols [36]. Verbal symbols are symbols that are used as a means of communication produced by speech instruments, while non-verbal symbols are symbols that use other parts of the body; symbol to mark time; as well as objects that have ritual and cultural meaning [37].

Religious symbols that are the result of representation are hereinafter referred to as religious symbols [38], [39]. A more comprehensive definition is expressed by Dorojatun (2018) which explains that religious symbols are symbols of obedience in carrying out religious rituals. The symbol represented is closely related to social relations [40]. For example, someone wearing a head scarf [41]; The use of a cap or sarong in political campaigns [42]. Based on the example above, it can be concluded that the headscarf, cap and sarong are religious symbols but when they are used for certain purposes or in other words they are represented, these symbols become symbols to address one's religion.

Based on the explanation above, it can be concluded that religious symbols and religious symbols have distinctive lines, namely their use and intended use. When a symbol that refers to a certain religion stands independently, the symbol is said to be a religious symbol. Furthermore, if a religious symbol is used by an individual with a specific purpose or motive, such as carrying out religious rituals or political campaigns, then the symbol changes its name to become a religious symbol. Therefore, religious symbols that are used with a specific purpose are called religious symbols.

3. Method

This study uses a qualitative approach. The qualitative approach is used because the qualitative approach relies on interpretations related to understanding community behavior from what is seen by the community itself. According to Denzin and Lincoln in Creswell (2007), qualitative research designs include narrative research, phenomenology, grounded theory, ethnography, case studies, and action research [43]. The use of a qualitative approach is because the researcher analyzes more deeply how religion and religious symbols are used as message content in the 2019 Presidential Election political campaign on the Twitter platform carried out by the campaign team of each candidate pair by observing the object of research in order to obtain data directly from communicator. The sampling technique used is purposive sampling. Purposive sampling according to Daniel (2012) is a data sample collection technique by taking into account certain conditions or criteria [44]. This technique was chosen because in this study the researcher was able to select samples from each subject and object of research by considering the appropriate criteria for each subject and object under study. Based on this, the successful teams studied in this study are:

Table 1.   Jokowi-Amin Success Team (Reaearch Subject)

Name	Position	Twitter Account
Tsamara Amany Alatas	Deputy Director for Rookie Voters	@TsamaraDKI
Rian Ernest Tanudjaja	National Campaigner	@rianernesto
Mohamad Guntur Romli	National Campaigner	@GunRomli
Budiman Sudjatmikol	National Campaigner	@budimandjatmiko
Ganjar Pranowo	National Campaigner	@ganjarpranowo
Name	**Position**	**Twitter Account**
Ruhut Sitompul	Team Bravo 5	@ruhutsitompul
Fadjroel Rachman	Jokowi-Amin Supporter	@fadjroeL

Table 2.   Prabowo –Sandi Success team (Reasearch Subject)

Name	Position	Twitter Account
Mardani Ali Sera	Deputy of the National Winning Team	@MardaniAliSera
Fadli Zon	Steering Committee Members	@fadlizon
Tengku Zulkarnain	National Campaigner	@ustadtengkuzul
Faldo Maldini	National Campaigner	@FaldoMaldini
Dahnil Anzar	Coordinator Spokesperson	@Dahnilanzar
Gamal Al Bin Said	Spokesperson	@Gamal_Albinsaid
Fahri Hamza	Prabowo-Sandi Supporter	@Fahrihamzah

Data will be collected using qualitative content analysis techniques. Qualitative content analysis allows the collection of text data in the form of words, meanings, symbols, ideas, themes, and other forms of communication messages. The text referred to in qualitative content analysis allows the content contained in the communication media to be recorded and further analyzed [45]. This study also uses thematic data analysis techniques. The use of thematic analysis techniques was chosen in order to facilitate the achievement of the objectives of this study, namely to reveal the categories of campaign messages on Twitter.

4. Results and Discussion

Messages on twitter are referred to as tweets or tweets [46], which are spread by someone using the Twitter platform. In the context of this research, there are various types of message content narrated by the campaign team of each candidate pair in narrating religion symbols or religious symbols in their tweets. This section describes the various types or categories found by researchers.Discussion of findings was done in line with the four research questions presented below:

4.1 Commodification of Religious Greetings

In the context of a political speech or campaign, religious greetings are no longer a strange thing to be narrated, it can even be said that almost no one makes a speech without starting or ending the speech with a greeting. This has become a separate political culture in Indonesia. The greeting can be in the form of words that refer to a certain religious teaching [47], such as Christianity or Catholicism with Shallom, Islam with Assalamualaikum or Hinduism with Om Swastiastu. In fact, this culture is also carried in the campaign tradition using social media, although the massive use of greetings in tweets has not been used too much in campaigns using social media, especially the Twitter platform. This is a logical consequence of the limited character of the platform itself, namely 140 characters [48], [49].

Fig. 1. Tweet from @ruhutsitompul on 13 January 2019

In figure 1 @ruhutsitompul we can see that Sitompul write "shalom" in his tweet. Shalom is greating which identical with Christian and Chatolic. Lee and Kaak (2017) explain that shalom is diction that comes from the Hebrew Bible that uses Hebrew, which means peace or avoiding conflict. Furthermore, Lee and Kaak (2017) explain that shalom means problems in life, but also describes reality better [50]. There are two reasons that can explain why Sitompul embed the diction of this greeting in his tweets. First, Sitompul wants to be constructed as a religious Christian / Catholic while giving greetings, even though the tweet tends to be angry. Another evidence that strengthens this reason is that Sitompul embeds the diction of "God's Blessing", with this diction, it further adds to the assumption that Sitompul is a religious community. Meanwhile, Sitompul wants to create an identity that Christians / Catholics are in a position to support the Jokowi-Amin candidate pair.

One of the sample tweets above placing greetings that are identical to a particular religion in the same tweet as the campaign material for the presidential candidate pairs for the 2019 presidential election. As explained above, everything that is conveyed during the campaign period and contains information about the 2019 presidential candidate pairs can be classified as a campaign. Therefore, by placing greetings that are identical to a certain religion on the campaign material, it can be classified as a commodification of religious and / or religious symbols.

4.2   Clothing as a Religious Symbol

Syahputra (2016) in his writing narrates that there are cultural symbols that contain religious codes in them, such as robes, turban, prayer beads, call to prayer [51] or other symbols attached to the culture of a particular religion. In this context, there are several religious symbols that are narrated using either text or images in the presidential election campaign using the Twitter platform. Based on the data obtained during the research, here is one of the tweets from one of the campaign teams for the presidential election contestants.

Fig. 2. Tweet from @fadlizon on 17 February 2019

Fig. 3. Tweet from @fadjroel on 18 March 2019

There are several things that are interesting to discuss by looking at the religious symbols tweeted by the two campaign teams above. In Figures 2 it can be seen that Fadli Zon, who is one of the Prabowo-Sandi campaign teams, uses a brown turban and black skullcap with his index finger and thumb making a distinctive symbol with Prabowo-Sandi. This symbol was also followed by many people around Fadli Zon. This indicates that Fadli uses these religious symbols to form a religious self-image. This is intended so that Fadli as a loyal supporter of the Prabowo-Sandi candidate pair is also classified as a religious person so as not to degrade the narrative that Prabowo-Sandi is a religious figure [52].

In contrast to Fadli, Fadjrul Rahman, the owner of the @Fadroel account (figure 3) tweeted a picture of a person wearing a white turban complete with a black skullcap. Meanwhile, this person is not Rahman himself, but vice president Amin's . Likewise, Jokowi's presidential candidate is also depicted as wearing a black skullcap. This indicates that the process of identifying religious symbols is not only carried out with the subject of the account owner, but can also be identified to other people.

There are similarities in the two tweets discussed above, namely both using a black cap. Black skullcap is a religious symbol for those who use it [52], [53]. The success team uses a person's black cap to identify himself or others as a religious figure. Likewise with the turban, robe, prayer beads, headscarves and various other symbols.

4.3 Title as a Religious Symbol

Syahputra (2016) explains that there are religious authorities that are closely related to local culture such as clerics, buya, kiayi or master teachers [51], the holders of these religious authorities get nicknames or titles to identify their religious level. In this context there are several religious symbols narrated using either text or images in the presidential election campaign using the Twitter platform. Based on the data obtained, here are some examples of tweets presented by the two successful teams.

Fig. 4. Tweet from @fadjroal on 17 March 2019 and @Dahnilanzar on 15 March 2019

In Figure 4 it can be seen that there are two tweets distributed by @Fadjroel and @DahnilAnzar, there are similarities, namely using the same symbol from the two pairs of candidates in narrating a religious symbol in the form of a religious title. Tweet @fadjroel pointed out that @fajdroel tweeted a sentence "Supported by Ulama throughout Indonesia, Prof. K.H. Ma'aruf Amin: This is a Blessing # 01JokowiAmin #waprekukiayi # 01IndonesiaMaju #PrayForJayapura #BarengJokowi #AbahKita ". In the tweet, @fadjroel also attached a piece of news. The headline with a tweet @fadjroel has a slight difference, where the title only says "Ma'aruf" but @Fadjroel tweeted complete with its religious title, namely "K.H" or Kiai Haji. This is a symbol that strengthens Amin's own religion, but Sandiaga does not have this symbol. As is well known, Sandiaga did not come from the typical pesantren called *Kiai* for teachers at the pesantren.

In the tweet @Dahnilanzar wrote "Discussing with KH Tohir Zaein, caretaker of the Mambaul Ulum Islamic Boarding School, Bata-Bata, Pamengkasan-Madura". In the picture, it can be seen that Dahnil narrates the religious title by adding a photo, where the kiai in question uses the red garuda logo which is the symbol of the Prabowo-Sandi candidate pair. This further strengthens the assumptions expressed by Batubara and Malik (2014) which reveal that ulama can act as campaigners [54].

4.4 *Salat* and *Nyekar* as Political Commodities

Santosa (2014) explains that tradition is something that has been done to become part of the life of a group of people, usually from the same country, culture, time, or religion [55]. Departing from the definition, it can be concluded that religious tradition is something related to religion that has been carried out by a group of people from generation to generation and has a supporting community. Based on this definition, it can be classified that all behavior related to religion is a form of religious tradition, including prayer and nyekar. The discussion related to religious traditions found on the account of the success team of the two candidate pairs is as follows.

Fig. 5. Tweet from @fadjroal on 17 Des 2018 and @ruhutsitompul on 11 Nov 2019

In Figure 5, there is a tweet by @fadjroel indicating that the presidential candidate Jokowi is praying in congregation with himself acting as the imam. In the teachings of Islam, congregational prayer is better than praying alone. This is because congregational prayers have better values in the eyes of God and have advantages in terms of sociology, namely establishing friendship and eliminating social degrees [56]. The purpose of @fadjroel to tweet this image is as a counter narrative against Jokowi. This is because Jokowi is always identified with a figure far from Islam [57]–[59]. Meanwhile, on the other hand, the dissemination of photos of the congregational prayers by @fadjroel as sucsess team Jokowi-Amin, this proves that Jokowi-Amin also played religious issues in the 2019 presidential election campaign.

In the same picture, there is a tweet belonging to @ruhutsitompul which means "How do you want to win the Presidential & Vice Presidential Election, Sandi. The vice presidential candidate is not focused. It is clear that Nyekar went to the grave of NU figures but his mind was not in the atmosphere of Nyekar and the result was fatal, so that he crossed the grave that we all have to

respect, #01SudahJokowiSaja MERDEKA". Nyekar tradition or grave pilgrimage is not a foreign tradition for Muslims, especially Islam on the island of Java. According to Geertz (2016) nyekar or grave pilgrimage serves to remind people that humans will return to God. Meanwhile, in a political context, this is not necessarily the case. Approaching the electoral agenda, the intensity of nyekar or eating pilgrimages, especially the graves of people who are famous for their intensity, will increase because they have other agendas [60].

4.5   An Expression of Gratitude as Political Commodities

In the context of conventional campaigns, gratitude is very often narrated as merely giving thanks but has an impact as a symbol of one's religiosity. This has become a separate political culture in Indonesia. The expression of gratitude can refer to a particular religion such as Christianity or Catholicism with Praise to God or Islam with Alhamdulillah. This culture is also carried in the campaign tradition using social media, even though the use of this culture has not been massively used. This is a logical consequence of the limited character of the platform itself, namely 140 characters [48], [49].

Fig. 6. Tweet from @Fahrihamzah on 20 March 2019

In picture 6, you can see @fahrihamzah writing Alhamdulillah. @fahrihamzah expresses gratitude that is identical to the Islamic religion, namely Alhamdulillah in response to the news written by the Independent Republic with the title Aroma Kemenangan itu Sudah Didepan Mata. Gratitude is classified as using a religious issue because in the same tweet is #PrabowoSudahMenang. Meanwhile, in Figure 5, @ruhutsitompul expresses gratitude that is identical to Christianity or Catholicism, namely praise God. @ruhutsitompul expressed his gratitude in the context of praying for a peaceful earth in the context of the Presidential Election and the Legislative Election which went on happily.

The use of the diction of gratitude which is identical to religion is a form of politicization of religion. The politicization of a good deed in the form of ideas, ideas, understanding and other values relating to religion becomes political, not religious anymore [54]. Based on the above definition, it can be seen that the success team of the two pairs of candidates did not make pure gratitude a form of gratitude to God, but instead made the diction full of political content by placing campaign materials in their tweets. This political gratitude is narrated using social media Twitter because Twitter can help to increase popularity in an election [61]–[63]. This is evidenced by the hundreds of retweets, likes and comments on these tweets

4.6   House of Worship as a Place for Political Campaign

Religious symbols can also be represented from buildings that are identical to that religion. Like Hinduism with temples, Buddhism with monasteries, Christianity or Catholicism with churches and Islam with mosques. These religious buildings are not only used as places for human spirituality to relate to God through worship, but also as places for political campaigns. This is evidenced by the findings obtained by the researchers below Religious symbols can also be represented from buildings that are identical to that religion. Like Hinduism with temples, Buddhism with monasteries, Christianity or Catholicism with churches and Islam with mosques. These religious buildings are not only used as places for human spirituality to relate to God through worship, but

also as places for political campaigns. This is evidenced by the findings obtained by the researchers below.

Fig. 7. Tweet from @fadlizon on 11 January 2019

Fig. 8. Tweet from @Dahnilanzar on 11 February 2019

In Figures 7 and 8 that have been presented above, it can be seen the paradox displayed by sucsess team Prabowo-Sandi. On the side of the tweet, which is in the form of the text @fadlizon, narrates being a marriage witness for the marriage of Syawaludin and Agustini. And @Dahnilanzar narrated himself doing a lecture. Both facilities were carried out at the mosque, but their tweets in the form of text were denied by their tweets in the form of images. In the same tweet, @fadlizon was seen taking pictures with the people around him pointing a finger that is identical to the Prabowo-Sandi symbol, as well as what was done by @dahnilanzar.

The use of mosques as places for political activity is not new, considering mosques have political functions [64], [65]. This is different from other places of worship such as churches that do not have a political function, because the relationship built in them is the relationship between humans and God. [66].

It should be noted in this case is the political function with practical politics. According to Siskandar & Yani (2020), the political function exemplified by the Prophet Muhammad is such as discussions on government issues, discussions of war tactics, peace, and so on [65]. Meanwhile, what Fadli and Dahnil did above was practical politics. Practical politics itself can be interpreted as intention, motive, interest, and ambition, co-existing and interrelated to fight for or maintain power. [66].

As can be seen in Figures 7 and 8, it can be seen that the two people point to symbols associated with a particular candidate pair. Moreover, the time when Fadli and Dahnil spread the tweets was part of the campaign period. Based on this, their behavior in places of worship is a practical political

act, not a political function. Therefore, if there are politicians who argue that conducting political campaigns in mosques is appropriate because mosques have a political function, based on the above definition this is not correct. This is what causes religion to be inseparable from practical political activities carried out by elements involved in politics, and in this case religion often becomes a political vehicle to achieve a political power goal [67].

4.7 "God" and Political Campaign Rhetoric

God is an abstract substance that needs the help of symbols to describe His title or name. The designation of god varies from religion to religion, such as Islam with Allah, Christianity or Catholicism with Jesus Christ, Hinduism with Sang Yhang Widi and Buddha with parama buddha or sanghyang adi buddha or hyang tathagata or the One and others. It turns out that the divine symbol has also been juxtaposed several times with political campaign rhetoric material which causes the symbol to be commodified as seen in Figures 9.

Fig. 9. Tweet from @Dahnilanzar on 11 February 2019

Based on these tweets, it can be seen that, clearly, Ruhut placed a symbol of the divinity of Christians and Catholics, namely Jesus, into one tweet which is the same as the campaign tweet. This is because the tweet contains the hashtag # 01JokowiLagiIndonesiaMaju, which indicates that this tweet is full of campaign content. Therefore, the symbol of divinity can or at least be found in the tweets during the 2019 presidential election campaign.

Bergh (1991) explains that there are three paradigms in seeing identity politics, namely primordialism, constructivism, and instrumentalism. In the context of using the divine symbol as a political commodity, it is known that it is included in the instrumentalist paradigm. Because the use of this symbol as a political commodity is in line with the paradigm view above. The instrumentalist paradigm views that the attributes of ethnicity such as religion are used for the purpose of political mobilization in order to achieve goals [68]. This assumption is proven because the use of diction, which symbolizes God, is put together with campaign materials that are identical to the candidate pairs who are contesting. This proves Kaylor's (2010) statement which states that the use of "god" diction is often used in political campaign rhetoric

5. Conclusion

The successful team in the 2019 presidential election was found to be using various themes in their tweets during the campaign period. Various kinds of themes such as the use of religious greetings, the use of clothes to show religious levels and the success team several times used the mosque as a place for political campaigns or carried out practical political activities that were spread through the Twitter platform.

Acknowledgment

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