Exploring Indonesia government outbreak response: Misinformation of public officials in handling of Covid-19 **Pandemic**

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ABSTRACT

The Covid-19 outbreak started in March 2020, and the Indonesian government has taken a long time to respond to it. With different ambiguous statements, public leaders contributed to the disruption of knowledge concerning the Covid-19 pandemic. Therefore, the study aims to investigate the communication strategy of Indonesia's government in response to the early Covid-19 pandemic in March 2020. This study uses a qualitative method that analyzes news text from online media. The data collection technique in this research is a literature study. The source of this research data comes from statements by four Indonesian ministers regarding the Covid-19 outbreak from online media. The goal of this study is to understand the narrative in online media concerning Indonesian public officials' response to COVID-19 by analyzing the word frequency using NVIVO 12 Plus software. Findings from this study indicate that numerous issues with the utilization and dissemination of information about the COVID-19 pandemic demonstrate a lack of maturity and caution on the part of the government and media. Indonesia's government could not provide excellent and precise information that followed the community's expectations regarding the pandemic. Indonesian public officials contributed to misinformation regarding the Covid-19 epidemic when dealing with the pandemic by providing ambiguous, incorrect, and misleading information.

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1. Introduction

Handling the COVID-19 pandemic outbreak in Indonesia began with a lot of miss communication of information by public officials. They exchanged statements about the lack of information about the new outbreak that had just entered Indonesia [1]. The confusion of information from authorized officials impacts the community's acceptance of the importance of management to prevent the spread of the epidemic [2]. From the start, the government did not have the right steps to handle the problem and did not carry out structured handling [3]. The government's response as the party most responsible for preventing the outbreak seemed dismissive and did not immediately take strategic tactical steps. Authorized officials exchange opinions by providing shortterm solutions that have proven unable to slow the outbreak's spread in Indonesia [4].



At the beginning of March 2020, Indonesia started life with uncertainty and even a mess. The Pandemic, dangers, Corona, Covid-19, information, and fear best describe the condition of global citizens, including Indonesia. Since the initial Covid-19 encounter in Wuhan, China, several issues have arisen from the end of 2019 to June 2020 in many other nations. Many forms of information appeared on national and global media with various platforms, from radio and television, newspaper, and online media, to information in social media. As stated by Rathore & Farooq (2020), the Covid-19 pandemic has brought about a number of novel effects and difficulties on a scale not seen in any prior pandemics, including the issue of information overload and infodemic [5]. Many parties were stating their own opinion and giving information as they know and understand the best about the Covid-19 pandemic [6]. People are turning to the internet rather than printed sources for health information [7]. Despite the fact that misleading information regarding COVID-19 is more harmful and deadly to people than any other type of malicious misinformation because it causes fear and compels people to make poor health decisions, the infodemic [8],[9],[10].

On the other hand, Indonesia Government seems underwhelmed in responding to this pandemic, including giving out accurate information to the public [11]. Indonesia's government showed negligence when the Covid-19 pandemic first broke out in Wuhan, China, despite the likelihood that Indonesia might be affected by it in the early months of 2020 [12]. Many public officials, including Indonesia president Joko Widodo, were so calm with the threat that might attack and not only affect the health sector but also trigger new problems in the social and economic sectors. Although, according to Ali & Bhatti (2020), public health awareness of COVID-19 is the most effective tool to protect against this crisis, a government of a country should be able to create public health awareness [13].

When the first Covid-19 instance arose in Indonesia and was initially made public on Monday, March 2, 2020, there were numerous other statements regarding the matter that were likely not taken seriously. President Joko Widodo's initial statement of the first case in Indonesia marks the beginning of a new phase of disorganized cross-information about Covid-19 from the government and media [14]. Since the first confirmed incidence of the Corona Virus in Indonesia, the public has been flooded with news and information concerning the epidemic [11]. From conventional media such as radio, news, and television to new kinds of media on various platforms like news portals, the web, and social media [15]. It was spreading out to the public every day in many types and forms of information about the Coronavirus outbreak [16]. The Coronavirus which comes from China and the fact it is harmful enough can cause to death had arisen fear from Indonesian [17]. This research shows how the government's initial response was in handling the pandemic as a logical responsibility. While other research raises issues related to the impact of Covid from a social and economic perspective, this research actually tries to formulate a concrete step that the government should take when faced with a pandemic outbreak. It cannot be denied that in the future the problem of pandemic outbreaks will remain a serious threat to all governments in the world [18].

Three main elements can be identified in earlier research on Covid-19 and the Indonesian government. The first is the government's approach to COVID-19. Government initiatives to stop the spread of the coronavirus, such as the recommendation to stay at home; Social distancing; Physical restraints; Use of Personal Protective Equipment; Uphold Personal Hygiene; Conduct work and study at home; postpone all events that would draw large groups; Large-Scale Social Restrictions; prior to the New Normal policy's establishment. In order to ensure that the community is able to survive, the government has also created social assistance and social protection programs. These policies benefit both those who require social welfare services and the upper classes in society [19],[9],[20],[21]. Second, government communication in dealing with Covid-19 President Jokowi and the governors of Indonesia use the social media platform Twitter to communicate and coordinate the handling of Covid 19 in Indonesia. President Jokowi emphasized on Twitter that all government representatives, both at the national and local levels, as well as the general public, must band together to fight the coronavirus and support the expedited treatment of Covid 19 [22], [23],[24].

Third, government public services during the Covid-19 pandemic. The Covid pandemic that hit Indonesia caused changes in public services. Changes in public services occur in the Standard. Public service standards include service procedures, timeframes, tariffs/costs, service products, and infrastructure. Information technology should be used to its fullest potential during the coronavirus epidemic. Public services can be provided without requiring direct contact between the waiter and

the person being served thanks to the usage of information technology in the form of information delivery via the internet or social media [25],[26],[27],[28],[29],[30],[31]. The impact of the pandemic above should not have occurred if the government had been alert and focused on handling the pandemic by carrying out structured and systematic prevention. The process of closing flights from affected areas and a strict quarantine process could be an initial solution. The next step is to prepare adequate infrastructure for both affected patients and medical personnel. The preparation process was carried out as a preventive step, not a reactive step as was done by the government yesterday. In addition, it is also necessary to form a special team to communicate with the public in order to remain calm in situations of potential mass panic.

Based on this explanation, the novelty of this study focuses more on the Indonesian public official's response to COVID-19. After conducting various studies in previous research which mostly focused on studying the impact of Covid and the economy, this research focuses on issues surrounding the handling of the Covid outbreak by the government and government officials in various public channels. Therefore, the study poses the following research questions "how did the Indonesian public officials respond to Covid-19 at the start of the pandemic?". Are they responsible enough to provide information regarding the Covid-19 outbreak that started to enter Indonesia in early March 2020?.

2. Theoretical Framework

2.1. Infodemic Concept

According to a classic mass communication theory, which is the Hypodermic Needle Theory stated by Wilbur Schramm in the 50s assume, mass media has enormous power and the communicant (public) is set to be passive or not know anything [32]. Mass media is like a needle injecting information to the incorrect public goal so the public would easily believe the information. In the context of the Covid-19 outbreak. Media (mass media and new media) is competing to inject information into the public by citing various statements from public officials related to covid-19. Society does need to be given information about Covid-19 because of its dangerous effect on health and safety. However, because we live in a time of abundant news, people naturally feel overwhelmed when they are overloaded with information [33]. The government as the owner of information should be able to filter and ensure the validity of information disseminated to the public. From a security perspective, not all information, even if it is true, can be conveyed to the public, especially if the information is still in the form of officials' subjective assumptions. The government and instruments responsible for providing public information must understand mass communication and communication psychology.

Moreover, many kinds of information spread too much and even overloaded until it trapped society in incredible fear. Between the beginning of the pandemic until mid-March 2019, 196 hoaxes about the corona were discovered in Indonesia [34]. For example, information about the kinds of symptoms for people affected by the Coronavirus, how to avoid the transmission of the virus amongst humans, or how to handle the patient who is already affected by this deadly virus. Rather than getting the well and correct information about the epidemic, people need more reliable information. The problem of the Covid-19 outbreak is not only an epidemic but has developed towards an infodemic. At the Munich Security Conference on February 15, 2020, World Health Organization (WHO) Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus stated, "We are not just fighting an epidemic; we are fighting an infodemic." [35]. This term implies how very dangerous the infodemic is for the society in the whole world.

In Hua and Shaw (2020) Research about infodemic and emerging issues in China found that the effectiveness of mitigating measures was greatly aided by getting the right information. Good handling of fake news was an excellent step in this regard to reduce the spread of confusion and panic [35]. In China, when false information was spread or emergency supplies were mismanaged, the government acted swiftly to fix the situation. This differs from what happened in Indonesia, where public officials did not understand epidemics and infodemics.

According to Mietzner's research, the government of President Joko Widodo initially neglected the threat caused by the Covid-19 outbreak. When it did respond, the crisis measures were haphazard and confusing [36]. Mietzner concludes that the various aspects of Indonesia's

democracy's erosion crippled the country's COVID-19 response. The answer from the Indonesian government was painfully slow to come, and when it did, it was reluctant and disjointed. At first, public anti-scientism was what kept the administration from seeing clearly. In contrast to Mietzner's research which focused on the decline of democracy, which failed the Indonesian government to deal with the Covid-19 outbreak, this study focuses more on the causes of the Indonesian government's failure in handling the initial Covid-19 outbreak. Statements from public officials at the beginning of the outbreak became the primary data for this research, where it was a spontaneous response that was delivered in response to the Covid-19 outbreak.

An infodemic, as defined by the PAHO factsheet, is a huge rise in the amount of information surrounding a certain issue that can grow exponentially in a short amount of time due to a particular incidence, such as the ongoing pandemic [37]. When we type the word "coronavirus" in a search engine on the internet, will appear millions of information about the virus. Zarocostas (2020) said that false information, rumors, and information manipulation with questionable motivations are all on the rise. This trend, which in the age of technology is reinforced by social networks and spreads like a virus farther and quicker [38].

2.2. Mis-information about Covid-19: Public Officials

Mis-information or wrong information happened when wrong information or fake being given but there is no intention or goal to disadvantage individuals or other parties [39]. According to Wardle & Derakhshan (2017), there are two types of misinformation: false connection and misleading content. When the header, graphics, and captions don't align with or support the content, a false connection is made. While misleading content is the use of misleading information to frame a problem or individual. Misinformation in the present outbreak has a huge impact on many facets of life, particularly on people's mental health. Since searching for COVID-19 updates online has increased around 50% to 70%, according to PAHO (2020), numerous false or misleading tales are created and spread without any background or quality checks. Misinformation in the government's handling of Covid 19 has actually created conflicting information and is counterproductive to the steps taken by volunteers. Misinformation due to the government's unpreparedness even gave rise to trust issues in the government's ability to handle the outbreak.

Many statements from stakeholders and public officials amplified by the media failed to calm society and made society confused and scared. As stated by Mahmud et al. (2021), people are experiencing a go-ahead and penetrating time due to the COVID-19 epidemic. However, it has a negative impact on the planet and shocks people around the world in their homes, communities, and workplaces [40]. Unfortunately, the Indonesian government was not prepared with valid information about Covid-19.

3. Method

This study uses a qualitative method using a critical paradigm approach. The data collection technique in this research is a literature study. The object of this research is the analysis of the text material from the statements of Indonesian ministerial officials. There are six (6) writings about the Covid-19 epidemic that come from five different Indonesian ministries. These news articles are used to examine the statements made about the Covid-19 pandemic by Indonesian government officials. The data sources in this study are online news from tempo.co, detiknews, republika.co.id, and cnbcindoesia.com. This is because online media is a credible media that contains news about the statements of Indonesian ministry officials related to COVID-19. From the analysis of texts found in various online media, the researchers then explored the Indonesian government's communication strategy delivered by the ministers regarding handling the Covid-19 pandemic. The findings from these research data later elaborated the concepts and theories of information disruption. This study also uses relevant journal articles as data sources to explain stakeholder communication and information literacy. Research data was collected from media texts tempo.co, detiknews, Republika.co.id, and cnbcindoesia.com regarding statements or opinions from Indonesian government officials regarding handling Covid-19. The data and results of the study are presented in a qualitative descriptive form. NVIVO 12 Plus software is used in this study to evaluate the data. The word frequency function of the NVIVO 12 Plus is utilized to clarify the narrative in online publications about the response of Indonesian public authorities to COVID-19.

4. Results and Discussion

4.1. The Indonesia's Public Officials Response to Covid-19 Outbreak

Some Indonesian ministers seem unaware of the threat that might appear anytime to an Indonesian citizen. For example, the Health Minister of the Republic of Indonesia, Dr. dr. Erawan Agus Putranto, on 27th January 2020, was asked about the possibility of Indonesia being entered with the Coronavirus and answered with the saying "Enjoy Aja, Makan yang cukup (Just enjoy! Eat healthily)"[41]. By eating enough daily, the Indonesian people will stay healthy and not have to worry about the Coronavirus, which is starting to spread. These responses implied that Indonesia was immune to the Covid-19 epidemic. A statement from a public official that seems careless and not based on data and facts and only relies on assumptions. Luhut Binsar Pandjaitan, the Coordinating Minister for Maritime Affairs and Investment, expressed disdain in his remarks, "Corona Masuk Batam? Mobil? (Is Coronavirus entering Batam? Is it a car?)"[42].

The saying stated by Senior Minister Officials on the 10th of February 2020 made them seems like they did not care about Indonesian citizen who was concerned about the spread of Corona Virus outbreak to Indonesia. Information about the Coronavirus, which was reported to have entered Indonesia via Batam Island, was responded to by Luhut Binsar with a joke about the Corona brand car. As a state official with a great responsibility for the interests of the people, a senior minister should be more concerned and not take information lightly. Although the truth of the information received or asked is not yet known, public officials must be able to provide serious answers that can be accepted and reassuring to the public.

Besides, the Indonesian Minister of Transportation had also said a statement, "Kita kebal Corona Karena Doyan nasi kucing (We 'Indonesian' are immune to coronavirus because we love to eat nasikucing)"[43]. On the 17th of February 2020 altogether with the statement from Minister of Health, Terawan "Belum ada kasus positif berkat doa masyarakat (There are no cases, yet and that thanks to the prayer of the people)" [44]. Many statements from Indonesian public officials appearing on media live made Covid-19 issues something not to worry about citizens. The pandemic continues to be rampant, and morbidity and mortality rates continue to increase nationally and globally (UNODC, 2020). This explains the urgency of the government's readiness and guarantees for the community for the occurrence of this global pandemic.

At the beginning of the positive case of Covid-19 in Indonesia, still got a cold response from the Health Minister of the Republic of Indonesia with a statement, "Harus diingat ini penyakit self limited disease, penyakit yang bisa sembuh sendiri. Ini sama seperti virus lain (This has to be remembered that this is a self-limited disease, it can heal by itself. it is just the same with another virus [45]. That is a sentence that shows some careless response to the Coronavirus when Indonesian citizens started to be concerned and feared this Virus outbreak coming from Wuhan. This declarative sentence from the Health Minister did not raise public awareness of the dangers of the coronavirus. Whereas taking preventative measures is necessary to control this pandemic disease, raising public awareness will help to lessen the severity of the rate of spread and minimize the fatality rate [13].

Government officials like Coordinating Minister of Politic, Legal and Security Affairs, Mahfud M.D. tries to calm the society with a statement "Setiap daerah itu supaya membuat tenang, tidak membuat situasi seperti menakutkan itu ya, biasa saja. Yang lebih banyak membunuh manusia itu justru flu biasa, bukan Corona itu (It is expected for the regions to remain calm and not making the situation like something horrendous. Please to remain calm. The most cause of killing a human is rather common flu and not the Corona)" [46]. The statement from Mahfud on 3rd March 2020 was trying to reassure Indonesian society. However, the media instead flooded almost all media platforms with information about Corona Virus (Covid-19). Thus, the media's information, news reports, and vague statements from Indonesian public officials resulted in massive confusion and fear in society.

Many statements from public officials were not based on data and facts, creating an information crisis. Whenever some of the region's public officials take the initiative to do some restriction policy or regional lockdown, at the same time on 16th March 2020, the President informed that lockdown is a central government policy and not to be taken by the regional government. This information is creating quite a confusion for the lower class of society because, at that moment, the pandemic had

spread not only in Jakarta as the epicenter but had been spread to other areas like Bogor, Bekasi, Bandung, Solo, and Jogjakarta. The rejection against lockdown was confirmed once again by the President on 22nd March 2020 and affirmed by the rejection from President's house to the request from Jakarta Governor for regional lockdown. Nevertheless, the government finally published large-scale social restrictions (PSBB) regulations, which accommodate regional quarantine or lockdown.

4.2. Misinformation by Indonesia Public Officials

Numerous issues with the Covid-19 data demonstrate that the Indonesian government, as the key stakeholder, needs to get ready and be more laid back. According to Waligo et al. (2013), primary stakeholders are those who, without their involvement, the organization, the project, or both will either cease to exist or be unable to survive [47]. Different kinds of policies and information from the government through many organizations like the Ministry of Health, fast-response team for Covid-19, Spoke persons of Covid19, and regional public officials are creating more confusion than calming the situation. The Covid-19 spokesman is unlikely to gain the public's confidence in the information they have provided because they virtually always release the most recent data each day regarding the number of people infected with the coronavirus and the number of people who recovered or died. Continuously, the confusion and panic from Indonesian citizens increase within the PSBB policy in different regions being unclear and its consequences.

The government gave the media many suggestions and banned 'mudik' during the Eid Mubarak season in 2020, adding to the confusion. These issues cause the public's confidence in the government to decline and potentially disappear as a result of how Indonesia's government is handling the Covid-19 outbreak. Despite controlling the citizen in the middle of this outbreak, government and public officials shared messages which created an uproar and controversy and led to ineffective communication because it failed to achieve the government's goal. As stated by Fuzhi et al. (2019), the national health literacy promotion program should as soon as possible include information literacy instruction [48]. For example, a suggestion was given to society about social distancing, large-scale social restrictions (PSBB), and a 'mudik' ban on home. In many excuses, some citizens still break the suggestion of social distancing as one of the ways to cut the transmission of coronavirus. PSBB, which has been done in some regions such as Jakarta, Bogor, Bekasi, Depok, and Bandung, also lacked attention and obedience from the public. Even the most recent data from Jakarta, which implemented the PSBB for 14 days starting on April 10 and ending on April 23, 2020, indicates an increase in Covid-19 cases. As the primary stakeholder with power, the government is not strict enough to use its power.

A social kindness that is desired in which much more is owned than just a self-perception. Legitimacy comes in many social organization levels resulting in values and norms built in the community or moral strength proofed by its ownership and acceptance in the community. MUI (Indonesian Ulema Council) and Ikatan Dokter Indonesia (Indonesian Physician Association) are stakeholders who have legitimacy in the middle of the Covid-19 outbreak. These two professional organizations are even heard and obeyed more than the government said. The majority of Muslims in Indonesia followed any fatwa (an official declaration or directive from an Islamic religious leader) that MUI issued about religious observances during the COVID-19 outbreak. For example, a fatwa is related to not doing a certain sholat (prayer) ritual like the Friday sholat and Tarawih at the mosque. And so do messages conveyed by IDI related to a general characteristic of those infected by the Coronavirus and ways of preventing Corona Virus transmission. This information is getting more attention and obedience from society.

Almost all governmental levels, the commercial sector, and the media were active in the stakeholder communication during the Covid-19 pandemic. The government and other stakeholders are supposed to collaborate and work hand in hand to face the pandemic. For each portion of involvement, the government, as the primary stakeholder supposed to have priority claim in all the proactive decision-making and reactive to its relation to other stakeholders and also influence the prospect of living for the stakeholders' system who got benefits. According to Freeman (1999), stakeholder influence is a set of actions stakeholders use to achieve their interests. [49]. Unfortunately, in this case, the technical implementation in the field having overlapped information causes the public to assume the government is indefinite in giving solutions or seems like it needs more solid legitimacy and urgency in problem-solving. The policy made by the stakeholders became unequal and spread unevenly in every region affected by Covid-19.

The key to success in managing a crisis like the Covid-19 pandemic depends on how effectively government communicates to other stakeholders in many crisis phases. This heavily depends on how quickly and precisely the company communicates with the appropriate stakeholders. Successful communication is essential if an organization wants to keep good relations with the main stakeholders [50]. Meanwhile Ndleda states that in the middle of the crisis, organizations, including the government, are supposed to open a communication path that includes all the stakeholders to stay close to the truth and consistent. Proactive communication is the first step in containing the shock and establishing credibility and confidence. The second phase would be creating a unified narrative for all parties involved while excluding variants. The Indonesian government did not do these two steps through their public officials, so their credibility was turned down, and they lost the public's trust. The Indonesian government was also inconsistent in how it developed the story's plot, using words like "social distancing," "large-scale social restriction (PSBB)," "new normal," and "new normal adaptation (AKB)," among others.

The "maturity" of Indonesian citizens in using and utilizing media as a source of information was not assured by the sheer number of internet users in Indonesia and the high frequency of content information access to new media and social media. The various platforms of new media, from the web, news portals, and social media, are not bringing society accurate information about Covid-19. Besides the gap, many misuses of information cases, reality bias, and the latest is the spread of hoaxes and disinformation that lead to information disorder. Disruption or information disorder has become one of the main problems in society, including Indonesia. The three types of information disorder associated with information pollution are misinformation, disinformation, and malicious information [39]. When false information is spread without any desire to harm people or other parties, it is referred to as misinformation or inaccurate information. Disinformation, on the other hand, is when information is deliberately produced to be false or fabricated and spread to harm people or other parties. Mal-information occurs when accurate knowledge is disseminated to underprivileged people or other parties, typically by putting private information in the open [51].

What the Minister of Health told Harvard researchers to support their claim that the coronavirus should have reached Indonesia on February 11th, 2020, is an example of false information from various public officials' claims. The President announced the first case of Covid-19 in Indonesia on March 2, 2020, contrary to information from the Minister of Health that said the Coronavirus had not yet reached Indonesia. Although this information may not be considered incorrect, the Minister of Health should exercise more caution when making a statement about the Covid-19 epidemic so that Indonesian residents are aware of it. Moreover, some Indonesian were staying in other countries at the moment. It even became a shocking decision for the public when President Joko Widodo put some promotion budget and social media buzzer for 72 billion rupiahs to avoid the fear of Covid-19 on 26th February 2020. It can be said that it was the biggest blunder in handling the epidemic, threatening almost the whole world. The policy implicitly says that Indonesia is free from Covid-19, so the government pushed their citizens to vacation in domestic places with the government's subsidy. The government is missed by the policy and supposedly wiser in stating a policy and giving out information.

He is fighting the fear of pandemic illness by hiring buzzers, just like what government did describe as misinformation if it is not said as disinformation. In this case, the government is trying to ensure the people of Indonesia that the Covid-19 pandemic will not enter Indonesia. The buzzer in the electronics world is almost the same as a loudspeaker, hired by the government to attack back information that declared Indonesia susceptible to the COVID-19 pandemic. On the other hand, the government demands that society not panic and remain calm about the spreading of Covid-19 to many countries worldwide. However, the government did not have any data or vital facts proofing that the pandemic would not enter that area of Indonesia.

This matter would create some interference and messy information in which the society loses its trust in the government due to invalid information. Invalid information from the government being amplified by media would strongly impact society. The notion that governments are the primary actors in shaping public policy, as well as the notion that the public may influence policy by holding elected officials accountable, are both under scrutiny [52]. The public should be able to hold elected officials accountable for their policies, including delivering information related to the Covid-19 pandemic.

4.3. Narrative in Online Media about the Response by Indonesia Public Officials

Narrative is a story told by newspapers, novels, comics, movies, and so on. The media as a transmitter is narrator who gives perspective to the story[53]. The Covid-19 pandemic in Indonesia is the main topic of discussion in the media as well as in the field of health. Since President Joko Widodo announced it on March 2, 2020, much news has been related to Covid-19. Every time the public space is filled with information about Covid-19. The media present a variety of viewpoints, including information on the progression of the number of Covid-19 infection cases, strategies to combat Covid-19, accounts of how Covid-19 has affected the local economy, and reports on the response of Indonesian state officials to cases of the Covid-19 pandemic. The news is consumed by the public and exchanged in more intimate spaces, giving rise to various interpretations and reactions [54].

In the context of the response of Indonesian public officials regarding Covid-19, which need to be in sync with one another. Online media narratives that make the news enjoyable to discuss. The information in figure 1 was produced through analysis utilizing NVIVO 12 plus software's Word Frequency feature since the narrative in the dispersed online news would also affect readers' impressions. The results of the analysis display narratives in online media related to the response of Indonesian public officials, namely by appearing the words "mahfud," "Budi," "terawan," "Menteri (Minister)," "pemerintah (Government)," "Panik (panic)," penyebaran (Spread)" etc.



Fig. 1. Narrative in online media regarding the response of Indonesian public officials

Fig.1. shows that the narratives spread by online media are, of course, about ministers issuing responses that are out of sync with one another. This is illustrated by the words that appear, such as "Mahfud," "Budi," "terawan." This response from Indonesian officials has confused the public and even tended to be cynical in responding to the asymmetry. The reason is that as a public official, what should be done is to give a definite statement and coordinate well with one another, but in reality, this is different. This also makes people's trust in the Indonesian government weak. According to Chris Miller in COVID-19 Crisis: Political and Economic Aftershocks, there has been a crisis of trust among citizens toward authority since the Covid-19 epidemic. Miller mentioned the criticism that numerous leaders of state, including Donald Trump (USA), Shinzo Abe (Japan), and Moon Jae In (South Korea), got for failing to contain the virus and allowing the number of infected individuals to keep rising [55].

Then, the narration in online media regarding the response of Indonesian officials about Covid-19 led to a commotion that occurred among the public at the time of the spread of the misinformation. This is illustrated in the words that appear are "panic" and "spread." During the early stages of the COVID-19 epidemic, in March 2020, the Indonesian government reacted cautiously. The government subsequently implemented measures including social safety nets, large-scale social restrictions (PSBB), and physical distancing. These laws will only be effective if society abides by them. The success of those policies may depend on society, either as a source of support or as a source of challenges. [9]. According to the reports, Indonesia's government handled COVID-

19 at the fourth-worst rate in the entire globe [10]. The mainstream media has led the charge in exposing the government's inadequate response. Recently, the hashtags #AmanDiRumah and #MediaLawanCovid19 both debuted with their initial pieces of content. This content was produced for multiple platforms and is being distributed simultaneously across radio, newspapers, television, the internet, and social media [56].

5. Conclusion

Many troubles related to the use and distribution of information about the COVID-19 pandemic show the incompetency of the government and media to be mature and careful. Information given to the public might be fixed, but the effect on the public would be hard to return to the initial condition. The information must be communicated effectively to benefit society and accordingly not make any noise, panic, or mess. Data and facts must be the ultimate guidelines for the government and media before spreading the information about the Covid-19 pandemic to gain public trust and minimize the disadvantaging effect on all parties. The Indonesian government supposedly consistently conveyed information on the Covid-19 pandemic through the Covid-19 fast-response team (*Gugus Tugas* Covid-19), speaking persons, and public officials from central regions. Indonesia's government could not provide information that followed the community's expectations regarding the pandemic. Facing the Covid-19 pandemic, Indonesia's public officials played a role in misinformation about the Covid-19 outbreak with unclear, false, and misleading information. The chaotic communication and information disruption about Covid-19 show that the government is not ready to handle the crisis. The information from Indonesia's government seemed unclear, was not well-coordinated, and caused panic and chaos in the community.

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